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The design failures of the Eurozone have been recognized quite late and have led 
the Eurozone policymakers to apply wrong macro-economic policies since the 
eruption of the sovereign debt crisis. This has led to a dismal macroeconomic 
performance of the Eurozone countries as compared to the EU-countries that 
decided not to be part of the monetary union.  
We provide empirical evidence that suggests that the biggest shocks in the 
eurozone were the result of business cycle movements. These were relatively 
well synchronised, except for their amplitude. We argue that efforts to stabilise 
the business cycles should be strengthened relative to the efforts that have been 
made to impose structural reforms, and consider the implications for the 
governance of the eurozone. 
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1. Introduction 
The sovereign debt crisis that erupted in 2010 exposed the design failures of the 
Eurozone. These have long been known. Right from the start of the Eurozone 
economists warned that these design failures would lead to problems and 
conflicts within the currency union, and that the Eurozone in the end would fall 
apart if these failures were not corrected (see e.g. Feldstein(1997), 
Friedman(1997), De Grauwe(1998))1.  
The existence of design failures raises the question of how the governance of the 
Eurozone can be redesigned so as to avoid a future disintegration. This is the 
question that we analyze in this paper. We will study how the Eurozone should 
be governed so as to make it sustainable in the long run.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the design failures of the 
Eurozone.  Section 3 analyzes the influence of the theory of optimal currency 
areas (OCA) on the governance of the Eurozone, and argues that the OCA-theory 
imposed a governance structure that did not correct for the main design failures. 
Section 4 reinterprets the OCA-theory to arrive at what we believe are the 
correct governance principles. Section 5 provided empirical evidence for our 
claims and Section 6 derives the implications for a sustainable governance. 
Section 7 provides the conclusions.  
 
2. Design failures of the Eurozone 
“Visionary” European politicians brushed aside the warnings from economists in 
the 1990s that the euro is based on a flawed construction. Nothing would stop 
their great monetary dream, certainly not the objections of down-to-earth 
economists. What are these design failures? We analyze two of these in this 
paper. There are others that are not discussed separately here, in particular the 
so-called doom-loop between sovereigns and banks. As we will stress this design 
failure is very much related to the second one discussed in this section. 
 
 
                                                        
1 Se also Baldwin and Giavazzi(2015) 
 3 
2.1 The Eurozone is not an optimal currency area 
The European monetary union lacked a mechanism that can stop divergent 
economic developments between countries. Some countries experienced a 
boom; others a recession. Some countries improved their competitiveness; 
others experience a worsening. These divergent developments led to large 
imbalances, which crystallized in the fact that some countries built up external 
deficits and other external surpluses. 
When these imbalances had to be redressed, it appeared that the mechanisms to 
redress the imbalances in the Eurozone (“internal devaluations”) are very costly 
in terms of growth and employment, leading to social and political upheavals. 
Countries that have their own currency and that are faced with such imbalances 
can devalue or revalue their currencies. In a monetary union, countries facing 
external deficits are forced into intense expenditure reducing policies that 
inevitably lead to rising unemployment.  This problem has been recognized by 
the economists that pioneered the theory of optimal currency areas 
(Mundell(1961), McKinnon(1963), Kenen(1969). Later important contributions 
include Bayoumi and Eichengreen(1993), Krugman(1993)).  
The standard response derived from the theory of optimal currency areas is that 
member countries of a monetary union should do structural reforms so as to 
make their labour and product markets more flexible. By increasing flexibility 
through structural reforms the costs of adjustments to asymmetric shocks can be 
reduced and the Eurozone can become an optimal currency area. This has been a 
very influential idea and has led Eurozone countries into programs of structural 
reforms.  
It is often forgotten that although the theoretical arguments in favour of 
flexibility are strong the fine print of flexibility is often harsh. It implies wage 
cuts, less unemployment benefits, lower minimum wages, easier firing. Many 
people hit by structural reforms, resist and turn to parties that promise another 
way to deal with the problem, including an exit from the Eurozone.  From an 
economic point of view flexibility is sometimes the solution. From a social and 
political point of view flexibility is the problem.  We return to this issue in section 
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5 where we show that the shocks that hit the Eurozone were in fact not of the 
kind that were emphasized by the OCA-theory.  
 
2.2 Fragility of the sovereign in the Eurozone 
When the Eurozone was started a fundamental stabilizing force that existed at 
the level of the member-states was taken away from these countries. This is the 
lender of last resort function of the central bank. Suddenly, member countries of 
the monetary union had to issue debt in a currency they had no control over.  As 
a result, the governments of these countries could no longer guarantee that the 
cash would always be available to roll over the government debt. Prior to entry 
in the monetary union, these countries could, like all stand-alone countries, issue 
debt in their own currencies thereby giving an implicit guarantee that the cash 
would always be there to pay out bondholders at maturity. The reason is that as 
stand-alone countries they had the power to force the central bank to provide 
liquidity in times of crisis.  
What was not understood when the Eurozone was designed is that this lack of 
guarantee provided by Eurozone governments in turn could trigger self-fulfilling 
liquidity crises (a sudden stop) that would degenerate into solvency problems. 
This is exactly what happened in countries like Ireland, Spain and Portugal2. 
When investors lost confidence in these countries, they massively sold the 
government bonds of these countries, pushing interest rates to unsustainably 
high levels. In addition, the euros obtained from these sales were invested in 
“safe countries” like Germany. As a result, there was a massive outflow of 
liquidity from the problem countries, making it impossible for the governments 
of these countries to fund the rollover of their debt at reasonable interest rate.  
This liquidity crisis in turn triggered another important phenomenon that we 
have documented in the previous section. It forced countries to switch-off the 
automatic stabilizers in the budget. The governments of the problem countries 
had to scramble for cash and were forced into quick austerity programs, by 
cutting spending and raising taxes.  A deep recession was the result. The 
                                                        
2 Greece does not fit this diagnosis. Greece was clearly insolvent way before the crisis started, but 
this was hidden to the outside world by a fraudulent policy of the Greek government of hiding the 
true nature of the Greek economic situation (see De Grauwe(2011)). 
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recession in turn reduced government revenues even further, forcing these 
countries to intensify the austerity programs. Under pressure from the financial 
markets and the creditor nations, fiscal policies became pro-cyclical pushing 
countries further into a deflationary cycle. As a result, what started as a liquidity 
crisis in a self-fulfilling way degenerated into a solvency crisis.  
Thus, we found out that financial markets acquire great power in a monetary 
union: they can force countries into a bad equilibrium3 characterized by 
increasing interest rates that trigger excessive austerity measures, which in turn 
lead to a deflationary spiral that aggravates the fiscal crisis, (see De 
Grauwe(2011) and De Grauwe and Ji(2013)).  This was the same problem as the 
one identified by Calvo(1988) and Eichengreen and Hausmann (2005) in 
emerging countries that are afflicted by an “original sin” that forces them to 
borrow in foreign currencies.  
It is in this fragile environment that the doom-loop between banks and 
sovereigns pops up as was made vividly clear in Ireland after 2010.  Bank 
failures in Ireland forced the Irish government to step in to bailout banks. In 
doing so the Irish government had to issue a lot of debt. As this was not backed 
up by the domestic central bank, this created a run on the Irish government bond 
market. In other countries the causality ran the other way (e.g. Greece): the crisis 
in the government bond market that erupted because of the absence of a lender 
of last resort in the government bond market triggered a banking crisis because 
the domestic banks were the major holders of domestic government bonds.  
From the preceding it follows that in a monetary union sovereigns singled out by 
financial markets cannot defend themselves unless they get help from other 
countries and from the European Central Bank. But these are not willing to do 
that easily. The ECB recognized this problem when it started its OMT-program in 
2012. This certainly helped to pacify financial markets at that time and avoided 
the collapse of the Eurozone. The issue arises of how credible the OT-program is 
for future use. The ECB has been unwilling to use it during the latest Greek crisis. 
This refusal was based on the view that the Greek government is insolvent and, 
                                                        
3 The dynamics that leads to bad equilibria is similar to the one that has been analyzed by 
Obstfeld(1986) in the context of fixed exchange rate regimes. See also Gros(2007) 
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therefore, central bank’s liquidity provision is not the right remedy. This can lead 
to doubts about the future willingness of the ECB to provide liquidity to future 
governments in times of crisis. 
It is clear that these design failures have been responsible for the dismal 
macroeconomic performance of the Eurozone countries since the eruption of the 
financial crisis.  In Figure 1 we compare the evolution of real GDP in the 
Eurozone with real GDP in the US and in the EU-countries not belonging to the 
Eurozone (EU10). The difference is striking. Prior to the financial crisis the 
Eurozone real GDP was on a slower growth path than in the US and in EU10. 
Since the financial crisis of 2008 the divergence has increased even further. Real 
GDP in the Eurozone stagnated and in 2016 was only marginally higher than in 
2008. In the US and EU-10 one observes (after the dip of 2009) a relatively 
strong recovery.  
Figure 2 shows the evolution of unemployment in the same group of countries. 
We observe the same phenomenon: A recovery in the US and EU-10 after 2010 
shown by the decline in unemployment. This contrasts with the Eurozone where 
unemployment continued to increase until 2014 so that in 2016 it was almost 
































Source: European Commission, Ameco database 
Figures 1 and 2 teach us that the European monetary union has failed dismally in 
delivering on the promises that were made at the start of the union, i.e. that EMU  
would lead to more economic growth and employment. The opposite has 
occurred. Member countries of the Eurozone have on average experienced less 
growth and more unemployment than the EU-countries that decided to stay out 
of the Eurozone. Such an outcome, if maintained, undermines the social 
consensus in favour of a monetary union. 
   
 3. Governance of a monetary union: the influence of the OCA-theory  
Since the eruption of the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone, substantial 
efforts have been made to create a new form of governance for the Eurozone that 
will make the monetary union more robust in absorbing future economic and 
financial shocks. Much of the drive to adapt the governance of the Eurozone has 
been influenced by the traditional theory of optimal currency areas (OCA), which 
stresses the need for flexibility in product and labour markets. As a result, the 
Eurozone countries have been pushed towards structural reforms that aim to 




































































































this would lead to a more resilient monetary union capable of withstanding 
future asymmetric shocks.  
The theory of optimal currency areas (OCA) has created a set of ideas that has a 
significant influence on the governance of the Eurozone and on views about how 
this governance should be strengthened in the future.  The best way to make this 
clear is to present the core of the OCA theory, using a well-known graphical 
representation of this theory (see De Grauwe (2014)). This is done in Figure 3.  
On the horizontal axis we set out the degree of flexibility in the labour and goods 
markets. This measures the degree to which wages and prices adjust freely to 
shocks and the degree to which workers are mobile. We assume that these 
different dimensions of flexibility can be represented by one index. On the 
vertical axis we set out the degree of symmetry between countries, i.e. the degree 
of co-movement (correlation) of macroeconomic variables such as output and 
employment. Thus, when there are a lot of asymmetric shocks we move 
downwards along the vertical axis. By contrast, when shocks become less 
asymmetric we move upwards along the vertical axis.  
The downward sloping OCA line represents the trade-off between symmetry and 
flexibility. Hence, when the degree of symmetry declines (there are more 
asymmetric shocks) countries in a monetary union need more flexibility to deal 
with these shocks. The OCA-line separates the space into two zones. The OCA-
zone above the OCA-line contains the collection of points at which symmetry and 
flexibility are high enough to guarantee that the benefits of the monetary union 
exceed the costs. The points below the OCA-line are the points at which 
symmetry and flexibility are too low, i.e. countries located in that zone will find 
that the costs of the monetary union exceed the benefits. The OCA-line that 
separates the two zones can therefore also be defined as the collection of points 






























This theory has been very influential for the governance of the 
Eurozone and continues to be so. It is at the core of the policy prescriptions that 
call for structural reforms so as to make the labour and goods markets more 
flexible. In fact, since the start of the sovereign debt crisis in 2010 member 
countries have been pressured by the European Commission to introduce a 
whole set of structural reforms. The member countries that turned to the 
Eurozone for financial support (Greece, Ireland, and Portugal) were given this 
support conditional on introducing a series of structural reforms that would 
make labour and goods markets more flexible. The underlying rationale was the 
OCA theory that stresses the need for flexibility to deal with asymmetric shocks 
in a monetary union. 
One of the underlying assumptions of this theory and its prescription for 
flexibility is that the asymmetric shocks are permanent. When shocks are 






buy more of the foreign than of the domestic good, or a productivity increase in 
one but not in another country, then there is really no other way in a monetary 
union to deal with such a shock other than changing relative prices (wages or 
product prices) or by a movement of labour and capital.  
Things are very different, however, when shocks are temporary. In that case, it 
can be argued that flexibility is not necessary. In fact it can even be harmful. Take 
the case of business cycle movements. When these are asymmetric, i.e. when 
they are not synchronised, it makes little sense to adjust by relative price 
changes and/or by movements of labour and capital. Flexibility may in fact 
exacerbate the business cycle movements and its asymmetry. For example, if 
country A experiences a recession and country B a boom the movement of labour 
from A to B is likely to exacerbate the recession in country A and the boom in 
country B.  Or take flexibility of wages. If during the recession country A is forced 
to reduce wages, the immediate effect of the wage cuts will be a decline in 
aggregate demand, which will make the recession in country A more severe. 
From the preceding analysis it follows that temporary shocks, such as business 
cycle movements, should be dealt with differently, i.e. by stabilisation efforts that 
smooth consumption over time.   
However, the OCA theory that focuses on the trade-off between flexibility and 
symmetry was developed on the assumption that asymmetric shocks are 
permanent. These shocks are also typically exogenous, like meteor impacts. 
There is nothing one can do about these. One is forced to adjust by making the 
system more flexible.  
Business cycle shocks, by contrast, can be said to be endogenous. They are the 
result of endogenous movements in optimism and pessimism that lead to booms 
and busts. These movements have been endemic in capitalism and will continue 
to do their work also in a monetary union. They have been described by Minsky 
(1986) and Kindleberger (2001). To the extent that these movements are not 
synchronised, they do not call for more flexibility; rather they call for insurance 
mechanisms that allow countries experiencing a downturn to be compensated by 
countries that experience a boom, in such a way that when the fortunes of 
countries are reversed the transfers are reversed.  
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It has long been recognised that such an insurance mechanism requires some 
form of budgetary union. Thus, endogenous and asymmetric business cycle 
movements call for very different institutions in the union from the permanent 
and exogenous shocks that have been at the core of the OCA analysis.  
 
4. Governance of a monetary union in the face of temporary shocks 
In this section we consider what the nature of the institutions of a monetary 
union should be when the shocks are endogenous, temporary and asymmetric. 
We will focus on business cycle movements that are driven by ‘animal spirits’, i.e. 
movements of optimism and pessimism that lead to booms during periods of 
optimism and recessions during periods of pessimism. In this section we focus 
on the theory. In the next section we analyse the empirical question of the nature 
of the asymmetric shocks in the Eurozone.  
We start from a similar tradeoff to the one in Figure 3, but now we concentrate 
on the tradeoff between flexibility and budgetary union. We define a budgetary 
union as a (partial) transfer of the national power to tax and to spend to 
European institutions. A budgetary union has the effect of creating an insurance 
mechanism that allows countries experiencing bad economic times to be 
compensated by countries that fare well.  
The way this tradeoff is constructed is as follows (Figure 4). On the vertical axis 
we set out the degree of budgetary union. The higher the degree of budgetary 
union the more we move upwards along the vertical line. On the horizontal axis 
we set out the same measure of flexibility as that used in figure 3. The OCAS line 
now measures the minimum combinations of budgetary union and flexibility 
needed to make a monetary union economically attractive (higher benefits than 
costs).  It is negatively sloped for the following reason. When budgetary union 
increases, insurance against asymmetric shocks increases, making monetary 
union less costly. As a result, there is less need for flexibility. We move upward 
along the negatively sloped OCAS line.4 
                                                        
4 We call this tradeoff the OCAs line because the idea of such a tradeoff comes from 
André Sapir (2015). 
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This is an important insight. Flexibility may sound great for many economists 
and central bankers, but it is costly for those people who are forced to be flexible. 
Flexibility means that these people may have to accept a wage cut or be forced to 
emigrate. We learn from Figure 4 that a movement towards budgetary union 
alleviates the (painful) need to be flexible. It may also make a monetary union 
more acceptable to large segments of the population. At the same time, however, 
it may make those who are asked to transfer revenue unhappy, resisting such a 
“Transfer Union”.  
 




























We can use the insights of Figure 4 to analyse the importance of the nature of the 
asymmetric shocks. We have made the distinction between asymmetric shocks 






and endogenous. We have argued that when a permanent (exogenous) shock 
occurs flexibility is the only option to adjust to this shock. By contrast, when 
business cycle movements are desynchronised it is not optimal to use flexibility. 
In that case an insurance mechanism is the appropriate way to govern the 
monetary union. A budgetary union provides this.  
It can now be shown that the nature of the shocks influences the slope of the 
tradeoff.5 When the shocks are mainly of the permanent type, we obtain a steep 
tradeoff. We show this in Figure 5. We have also put the Eurozone of 19 
members below the OCAS-line, suggesting that the present Eurozone is not an 
optimal currency area. The steep tradeoff implies that a small increase in 
flexibility leads us quicker into the OCA zone than a budgetary union. In the most 
extreme case, i.e. when all shocks are of a permanent nature, the tradeoff 
becomes vertical. In that case no amount of budgetary union will bring us into 
the OCA-zone. There is then no other way but to increase flexibility.  
Things are very different when the shocks are temporary, driven by business 
cycle movements. In that case the tradeoff is flat (Figure 6). As a result, much 
flexibility is needed to move the Eurozone into the OCA area compared to 
budgetary union. A relatively small increase in budgetary union will bring us into 
the OCA-zone. In the most extreme case, i.e. when all shocks are of a temporary 
nature,, the trade-off is horizontal. In that case no amount of flexibility will 
succeed in bringing the Eurozone into the OCA-zone. The only way to achieve 
optimality will be through a budgetary union.  
One complication that arises here has to do with hysteresis. Sometimes 
temporary shocks can lead to hysteresis effects. For example, a recession 
typically leads to plant closures and dismissal of workers. To the extent that 
these workers have developed firm specific skills that are lost when the firm 
disappears, the workers lose part of their human capital making it difficult to 
find another (comparable) job. Unemployment can then become protracted. 
Another example relates to the nature of the boom. If, as was the case in Ireland 
and Spain, the boom is concentrated in the housing market, many workers are 
attracted to this sector during the boom. After the crash they are dismissed. They 
                                                        
5 We are grateful to Frank Vandenbroucke for suggesting that the nature of the shocks  affects the 
slope of the tradeoff.  
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may find it difficult to use their skills acquired in the housing market in other 
sectors of the economy. There is a large literature on sources of hysteresis (See   
Blanchard, et al.(1986),  Ball(2009), Fatas and Summers(2015)). 
The existence of hysteresis has implications for our discussion. It implies that if a 
business cycle shock occurs it matters a great deal to try to use stabilization so as 
to avoid hysteresis effects.  If temporary business cycle shocks have permanent 
effects the need to set up schemes that will mitigate the impact of these shocks 
becomes even more important.  
 
 
Figure 5. How to move the Eurozone towards the OCAS-area when 





































Figure 6. How to move the Eurozone towards the OCAS-area when business 


























Figures 5 and 6 lead to another interesting insight. Flexibility in labour markets 
is something national governments can do. There is no need for further 
integration to increase flexibility. Budgetary union, however, is of a different 
nature. It requires political integration. In other words, while flexibility is in the 
realm of national governments, budgetary union is a European affair (Sapir 
(2015)). Thus, when shocks are permanent they have to be dealt with at the 
national level while when shocks are temporary the response should be at the 











5. The nature of shocks in the Eurozone: empirical evidence 
 
It is not always easy to separate permanent from temporary shocks in economic 
time series. Here we use a Hodrick-Prescott filter (HP) that allows us to estimate 
the long-term trend component in GDP. The cyclical component is obtained by 
subtracting the trend component from the observed GDP6 (for more detail, see 
appendix, where we also analyse the robustness of the results for changes in the 
smoothness parameter lambda in the HP filter).  
The results of this exercise are shown in Figure 7. We show the movements of 
the business-cycle components in the different Eurozone countries. These 
appear to move together but are of very different amplitude. Some countries like 
Ireland and Spain experience a very strong boom and later bust, while countries 
like Belgium, Austria and Germany experience similar cycles but of much less 
amplitude.  
In order to gauge the relative importance of cyclical and trend components in 
GDP growth we compare the mean (absolute)7 cyclical growth of GDP with the 
(absolute) mean trend growth of GDP for each country. We show the results in 
Table 1. We observe that for the core countries (Austria, Belgium, Germany, and 
the Netherlands) the cyclical growth and trend growth components are of 
similar magnitudes, although the cyclical component is systematically larger 
than the trend component. In the countries of the periphery (Spain, Portugal, 
Ireland, Italy, and Greece) this is very different. We observe that for these 
countries the cyclical growth component is much larger than the trend growth 
component (the most extreme case being observed for Greece). Thus, in the 
peripheral countries the GDP growth rates have been dominated by cyclical 
movements in economic activity of the boom-bust type.  
 
                                                        
6 There is a literature based on Blanchard and Quah (1989) that is based on estimating a 
VAR and, after imposing identifying restrictions, is able to estimate the temporary and 
the permanent component in output shocks. We discuss this literature in De Grauwe and 
Ji(2016)). 
7 As the cyclical component alternates between positive and negative numbers we have 
to take the absolute values.   
 17 
 
Source: Own calculation based on Eurostat. 
 
 
Table 1. Mean (absolute) trend growth and mean 
(absolute) business cycle change in GDP  






        
Austria 1,79% 1,77% 1,01 
Belgium 1,72% 1,67% 1,03 
Germany 1,55% 1,23% 1,26 
France 2,15% 1,49% 1,44 
Netherlands  2,66% 1,66% 1,60 
Finland 4,35% 2,02% 2,15 
Spain 4,58% 2,07% 2,21 
Ireland 8,01% 3,35% 2,39 
Portugal 3,67% 0,81% 4,53 
Italy 2,86% 0,41% 7,05 
Greece 9,09% 0,90% 10,11 
 
   
Source: Computations based on data from Eurostat. 
 
 
What are the implications of these results? First, since the start of the Eurozone, 
cyclical (temporary) movements have been the dominant factor behind growth 
variations in GDP. This is especially the case in those peripheral countries where 







































































































term growth rates. Thus, as mentioned earlier, booms and bust in economic 
activity seems to be the overwhelming characteristic of movements in GDP in the 
countries of the periphery.  
Second, it appears that the cyclical movements of GDP are highly correlated in 
the Eurozone. This was evident from Figure 7. It is also confirmed by Table 2, 
which shows the correlations in the cyclical components of GDP growth across 
the Eurozone. We observe high correlation coefficients of bilateral cyclical 
components of GDP growth, typically 0.8 or more8. It is interesting to note that 
the country with the lowest correlation coefficients is Germany (although the 
German correlation coefficients are all positive). Thus, one can conclude that the 
business cycles of the Eurozone countries were highly correlated. Germany 
stands out as the country with the lowest (positive) correlations of its business 
cycle with the rest of the Eurozone.   
Table 2. Correlation coefficients of cyclical components of GDP growth 
                      
  Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherl Port 
Austria 
         
  
Belgium 0,97 
        
  
Finland 0,97 0,98 
       
  
France 0,93 0,95 0,97 
      
  
Germany 0,69 0,57 0,55 0,59 
     
  
Greece 0,73 0,82 0,84 0,74 0,09 
    
  
Ireland 0,85 0,89 0,92 0,95 0,41 0,81 
   
  
Italy 0,91 0,96 0,98 0,96 0,50 0,86 0,93 
  
  
Netherlands 0,93 0,94 0,93 0,91 0,60 0,75 0,86 0,90 
 
  
Portugal 0,98 0,89 0,89 0,87 0,37 0,82 0,87 0,90 0,94   
Spain 0,85 0,91 0,94 0,87 0,27 0,97 0,90 0,95 0,86 0,90 
                      
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat. 
Thus, the asymmetry between the Eurozone countries is to be found not so much 
in a lack of correlation in business cycle movements but in the intensity of the 
boom-bust dynamics of growth rates. Put differently, Eurozone countries’ 
business cycles seem to have been relatively well correlated. The difference 
between these countries was that some (mainly in the periphery) experienced 
much higher variance in business-cycle fluctuations than others (in the core). As 
                                                        
8 In De Grauwe and Ji(2016) we study a behavioral macroeconomic model and show that in such 
a model “animal spirits” can easily get correlated internationally, producing high correlations of 
business cycles.  
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a result, the asymmetry between member countries is to be found in the variance 
of the business cycles.  
In order to obtain a more precise estimate of the asymmetry in the amplitudes of 
the business cycles, we regressed each country’s domestic cyclical component on 
the Eurozone common cyclical component. The estimated slope coefficients 
reveal the extent to which the domestic cycles are smaller or lower in amplitude 
than the common cycle. The estimated slope coefficients are presented in Table 
3. It is striking to find how different these slope coefficients are. Germany, 
Belgium, Austria and France have slope coefficients that are significantly lower 
than 1, suggesting cycles of significantly lower amplitude than the euro-cycle. 
Conversely, Finland, Spain, and especially Ireland and Greece, have slope 
coefficients significantly higher than 1.  This suggests that these countries 
experienced much higher amplitudes in their business cycles than the common 
euro-cycle.  
 
Table 3. Slope of regression domestic cycle on euro-cycle 












    
   Source: Own calculations. 
 
6. Implications for the governance of the Eurozone 
The findings reported in the previous sections put the need for stabilisation in 
the Eurozone in a new light. We analyse two implications that involve steps 
towards budgetary integration.  
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First, the finding of the overwhelming importance of the cyclical and temporary 
component of output growth should lead to the conclusion that efforts to 
stabilise the business cycle should be strengthened relative to the efforts that 
have been made to impose structural reforms. In terms of our theoretical 
analysis this means that Figure 6 is probably the relevant one. Again, this does 
not mean that flexibility can be disposed of.  
 
6.1 Common unemployment insurance 
A second implication of our empirical results relates to the many proposals made 
to create a fiscal space at the Eurozone level in the form of a common 
unemployment insurance system (see e.g. Van Rompuy, et al.(2012), the so-
called “Four Presidents report”, Enderlein, et al. (2012), Beblavy, et al. (2015)). 
The proposals for such an insurance system have very much been influenced by 
the standard assumption made in the OCA-theory that shocks are asymmetric, 
i.e. that when one country experiences a recession, and thus increasing 
unemployment, the other country experiences a boom, and declining 
unemployment. This facilitates the workings of the common unemployment 
insurance system. The booming country transfers resources to the country in a 
recession and thereby smoothes the business cycles in the two countries. 
Technically and politically such a system encounters relatively few problems.  
Problems may arise when, as we have found, business cycles are relatively well 
synchronised but of very different amplitudes in the different member countries. 
In that case most countries will tend to experience a recession at about the same 
time; in some countries the recession will be mild but in others very intense. This 
creates both an economic and a political problem. First, countries with a mild 
recession are asked to transfer resources to countries experiencing a stronger 
recession. This tends to reduce the intensity of the recession in the latter country 
at the expense of making it more intense in the former country. It is not clear 
that this improves welfare. Second, it is likely to create important political 
problems in the former country that is asked to transfer resources when the 
economy is not doing well.  
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Another way to formulate the previous insights is the following. The traditional 
proposals for a eurozone unemployment insurance mechanism are predicated 
on the view that there is a need to smooth differences in unemployment changes 
across countries. That is, it is assumed that some countries experience increases 
others declines in unemployment. The insurance mechanism then smoothes 
these inter-country differences. We have noted, however, that this is not a typical 
eurozone asymmetry. What we found is that most countries are likely to 
experience a boom and a recession at about the same time, with different 
intensities and amplitudes. There is therefore relatively little need for inter-
country smoothing of business cycle movements. The more pressing need is to 
smooth volatilities over time.  
The previous analysis suggests that common unemployment insurance schemes 
should put emphasis on smoothing over time and not so much on inter-country 
smoothing. This can be achieved by allowing the common unemployment 
insurance scheme to accumulate deficits and surpluses over time. The fiscal rule 
that could be imposed is that the insurance scheme balances over the business 
cycle. Beblavy and Maselli (2014) have performed interesting simulations of 
several schemes that impose such a fiscal rule. In general it appears from these 
simulations that such an insurance mechanism can be implemented. Such a rule 
would make it possible to automatically balance the need for inter-country and 
inter-temporal smoothing. 
The previous analysis makes clear, however, that given the importance of 
common business cycle movements, a common unemployment insurance 
mechanism will need a capacity to issue bonds during recessions when the 
payments made by the insurance scheme will exceed the contributions by the 
member states. During these periods the deficits of the scheme will have to be 
financed by the issue of common bonds, which one may want to call Eurobonds. 
Put differently, the common unemployment insurance mechanism will have to 
work like a common fund that is capable of issuing debt during recessions. If this 
is not allowed, a common unemployment insurance system cannot contribute 
much to common stabilization efforts.  Thus a workable common unemployment 
benefit scheme will necessarily imply some form of budgetary union. 
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Such a budgetary union can be kept relatively mild by imposing the fiscal rule 
mentioned earlier, i.e. that during common booms, the bonds issues during the 
recession are retired, thereby insuring that there is no long-term accumulation 
of common bonds.  Today, this is probably as far as one can go in the direction of 
a budgetary union.  
 
6.2 National stabilisation? 
In principle, inter-temporal smoothing could be done at the national level, by 
allowing the national budgets to do the job. However, the large differences in the 
amplitude of business-cycle movements makes such a purely national approach 
problematic, as it leads to large differences in the budget deficits and debt 
accumulation between countries. These differences quickly spill over into 
financial markets when countries that are hit very hard by a downward 
movement in output are subjected to sudden stops and liquidity crises (see De 
Grauwe (2011)). This is likely to force them to switch off the automatic 
stabilisers in their national budgets (De Grauwe and Ji (2012)). As we argued, 
there this can push countries into a bad equilibrium.  
Put differently, in the absence of a budgetary union, large differences in the 
amplitude of the business cycles are likely to hit the countries experiencing the 
more severe recession by “sudden stops”, i.e. by large liquidity outflows that 
force them to abandon any ambition to stabilise the business cycle shocks. In 
addition, these liquidity outflows are inflows in some other countries in the 
monetary union, typically those that are least hit by the recession.9 Their 
economic conditions improve at the expense of the others. The stabilisation of 
common business shocks with different amplitudes at the national level makes 
the system unstable.  
In this respect the research of Alcidi and Thirion (2015) is relevant. These 
authors find that while the core eurozone countries have been able to stabilise 
part (about 50%) of the business-cycle shocks at the national level since the 
                                                        
9 This is confirmed by the empirical work of Furceri and Zdzienicka (2013) and Hoffmann and 
Nitschka (2012) who find that during recessions risk sharing through financial markets declines 
dramatically.  
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eruption of the debt crisis in 2010, the peripheral countries have been unable to 
do so, and also unable to profit from insurance mechanisms at the level of the 
eurozone. As a result, most (90%) of the business-cycle shocks had to be 
absorbed by drops in consumption (and therefore in employment).  
National stabilisation efforts do not work but introduce an element of instability 
into a monetary union, mainly because they leave the countries most hit by the 
business-cycle shocks unable to stabilise. Thus, when business-cycle shocks 
dominate (as we have shown in the previous section) it will be necessary to 
follow a common approach to the stabilisation of the business cycles. The 
common unemployment insurance mechanisms discussed in the previous 
section move us in this direction. Whether these schemes are important enough 
to perform a significant stabilizing role remains to be seen.  The common 
insurance mechanisms now being proposed (see Beblavy and Maselli (2014)) 
have a relatively small inter-temporal smoothing component, amounting to no 
more than 0.1% to 0.2% of GDP over the business cycle, certainly insufficient to 
produce a significant inter-temporal smoothing at the EU-level. 
Thus, in the long run further steps towards a budgetary union will be necessary. 
By centralising part of the national budgets into a common budget managed by a 
common political authority, the different increases in budget deficits following 
from a (common) recession translate into a budget deficit at the union level. As a 
result, the destabilising flows of liquidity between countries disappear, and the 
common budgetary authority can allow the automatic stabilisers in the budget to 
do their role in smoothing the business cycle. In fact, because a common budget 
also generates implicit inter-country transfers the countries with the deepest 
recession will profit from the automatic stabilising features of the common 
budget most. As a result, a common budget provided the most effective way to 
stabilise the business cycle.   
It is clear, however, that a budgetary union in which a significant part of national 
taxation and spending is transferred to a European government and parliament 
is far off. For the time being less ambitious efforts, such as the common 
unemployment insurance systems, are all that is feasible. They are important 
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though in that they make clear the direction the Eurozone institutions will have 
to take in the future (see also Vandenbroucke(2015) on this). 
 
7. Conclusion 
The design failures of the Eurozone have been recognized quite late and have led 
the Eurozone policymakers to apply wrong macro-economic policies since the 
eruption of the sovereign debt crisis. This has led to a dismal macroeconomic 
performance of the Eurozone countries as compared to the EU-countries that 
decided not to be part of the monetary union.  
Since the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone, member countries have been 
pushed towards introducing more flexibility into labour and product markets. 
This drive towards structural reforms was very much influenced by the 
traditional theory of optimal currency areas (OCA). This theory stresses that in 
the face of asymmetric shocks member countries should have a sufficient degree 
of labour and product market flexibility to adjust to these shocks. Without such 
flexibility adjustment will be impossible, thereby undermining the sustainability 
of the monetary union.  
The underlying assumption of the OCA prescription for structural reform is that 
asymmetric shocks are permanent (e.g. permanent changes in preferences or 
productivity shocks). When the shocks are temporary it does not follow that 
more flexibility is the answer. More specifically, when the shocks are the result of 
unsynchronised business cycle movements, the way to deal with them is by 
stabilisation efforts.  
In this paper we have provided empirical evidence to suggest that the most 
significant shocks in the Eurozone have been the result of boom and bust, driven 
by waves of optimism and pessimism. These business-cycle movements have 
been relatively well-synchronised. What was not synchronised was the 
amplitude of these business-cycle movements, where some countries 
experienced much greater amplitude in business cycles than others. 
In principle, these business-cycle movements could be stabilised at the national 
level without the need for budgetary union. However, as the amplitude of these 
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movements is so different, countries experiencing the deepest recession are 
likely to be hit by ‘sudden stops’, i.e. liquidity outflows triggered by fear and 
panic, which forces them to switch off the automatic stabilisers in the budget, 
preventing them from conducting any stabilisation.  
We argued that the best possible way to deal with the business-cycle movements 
whose amplitude is unsynchronised is by introducing a budgetary union. By 
centralising part of the national budgets into a common budget managed by a 
common political authority, the various increases in budget deficits following 
from a (common) recession translate into a budget deficit at the union level. As a 
result, the destabilising flows of liquidity between countries during the recession 
disappear, and the common budgetary authority can allow the automatic 
stabiliser in the common budget to perform its role in smoothing the business 
cycle. 
It is highly unlikely that the governance of the Eurozone will move in the 
direction of creating institutions capable of providing the necessary stabilisation 
of booms and busts that national governments are no longer able to provide. The 
willingness to move in this direction is minimal. This has much to do with the 
absence of a “deep variable” in the monetary union. This deep variable is the 
sense of belonging to the same (European) nation and that creates the political 
basis for organizing transfers between countries. The absence of this deep 
variable makes it inevitable that one looks for schemes that introduce some 
stabilisation at the Eurozone level without going all the way towards budgetary 
union. 
We discussed common unemployment insurance schemes that are now being 
proposed and stressed that these have to put more emphasis on inter-temporal 
insurance and less on inter-country insurance. This also implies that they should 
have the capacity to issue bonds during recessions, and to do the opposite during 
an economic boom, making sure that over the business cycle there would be no 
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